"Colombia today is more insecure than six months ago?, Does the Government has allowed the achievements in national security have been diluted?, in fact, in these instances to answer with complete certainty is not far from the pure meanness. But consider some important issues to start the scan.
On the one hand, between 2005 and 2009, when building a very strong security policy that led to the peripheries to the armed groups, the killings were a clear downward trend. A trend of 70 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, in 2008 the rate suggested 34 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, while in 2009 the figure rose to 39 homicides for the same proportion of the population. If Colombia had 15.52o homicides in 2008 and 2009 showed 17,717, we identify a strong increase of 16%. However, between 1999 and 2008, homicides decreased by more than 50%, 70 homicides we "only" 30 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants. A very general average, considering that Medellin handled 40 homicides rates while Bogotá reaches 20 per 100,000 inhabitants.
If we stay in the arithmetic of crime, we see that there is a markedly downward trend in much of the first decade of the century, but if we delve into the analysis found that the composition of crime in Colombia there have been significant variations. Although I do not know figures, it is likely that most of the killings in 1990 were highly explained by the rise of leftist guerrillas and right-wing militias self-defense. No doubt the tactic of irregular warfare carried out by illegal armies in Colombia have to accompany their actions with horrendous human rights violations.
But in the 2000's, things have changed: 87% of homicides in Colombia are related to unknown authors, that is, 15,533 cases, while only 358 cases are directly related to guerrilla groups, for example, something that symbolizes the loss power of these groups, their gradual withdrawal and inability offensive. But there is concern that more than 15,000 homicides cases are explained by "isolated" and no author. Legal Medicine suggests that 11.7% of homicides are vested in the interpersonal violence while only 6.2% to socio-political violence, ruling that Colombia go through a civil war, as some neighbors wanted to preach in the world to feed its ideological alignments.
saw the picture, the security gains have been evident. On the one hand, the sharply downward trend of criminal acts, high impact moreover, that the very structure of conflict has changed: if yesterday the biggest perpetrators of violence were irregular armies today are criminal gangs and the intolerance of a country which, anyway, is violence in your code genetic. But it remains in the environment if the feeling of insecurity in recent months, driven by media coverage of violent actions as the murder of two students in Cordoba, is a valid concern for a systematic behavior that puts at risk the achievements of the Democratic Security the last decade re-composition of guerrillas or paramilitaries, or is the answer to a phenomenon of violence again, maybe low impact that the internal conflict of the twentieth century but that requires a new government strategy. I favor the latter.
We live in a fragmented mafia violence, not armies that controlled entire regions. Criminal gangs are driven by very powerful economic incentives put forward by the illicit drug business. This is what happens in Mexico, but not the same thing happens in the smaller countries of Central America. While the evidence supports that high youth population without access to opportunities for social mobility in countries like El Salvador has a strong correlation with homicide these nations, in Colombia this evidence is poor. Contrary to what the Medellin combos seem to project, the violence in Colombia in recent times is held by the existence of mafias moved juicy income from illegal businesses.
So, Colombia is facing an escalation in violence as the time when the FARC took over large areas. Today we see the results of a security policy that changed the structure of violence, but did not anticipate that the dynamics of social phenomena strategies required to raise two stages: for the before and after. But yes, if it is believed to have been a point of no return was irregular armies final victory, we were wrong, with the business of international drug running, the chain of incentives are maintained. What's in the background is that crime is set to the new conditions.
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